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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

.

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

FRANCIS EUGENE KNILL,
Defendant-Appellant.

.
.
.
..

Case No. 18122

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with committing the crime of
Theft in violation of Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-6-404 (1953), as

amend en.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury which found him
guilty of Theft on October 15, 1981 in the District Court in
and for Emery County, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding.
The court pronounced judgment at that time and sentenced
appellant to imprisonment for a term of one to fifteen years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment and sentence rendered at the trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 25, 1981, a highway patrol sergeant noticed
appellant driving down a hill at a high rate of speed (T. 50).
The officer followed the car and called in the license plate
number, which identified the plates as stolen (T. 52).

A

second officer appeared and the two officers then stopped
appellant.

Appellant's driver's license did not match the

car's registration (T. 52) because the car was registered to
Eric Wichgram (T. 58).

An insurance card in the car also bore

Wichgram's name (T. 58).
The serial number found on the car door also nid not
match the registration card (T. 56).

Wichgram, the car's

owner, had replaced the car doors and the serial number on the
door belonged, of course, to the car from which the door was
taken (T. 41).
Despite the conflict in serial numbers, Wichgram
proved ownership of the car through extensive testimony (T.
37, 38).

He had installed a custom stereo system (T. 40),

replaced the seats (T. 40), and installed a clock, tachometer
ano interior console.

Also, he reported the car as stolen,

using the correct serial number from the body of the vehicle

(T. 43).
The license plate on the stolen car did not belong
to Wichgram.

The plate had been stolen from a third party,
-2-
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a relative of appellant's (T. 64, nS).

The relative did not

loan the plate to appellant and had, in fact, reported it as
s to 1 e n ( T • 6 5- 6 6 ) •

Appellant claimed that he had traded a motorcycle
for the car (T. 56); however, he did not produce a bill of
sale, was unable to recall the alleged prior owner's last
name, and did not attempt to use this story as a defense at
trial.
After counsel was appointed for appellant, he waived
the preliminary hearing (R. 1).

Appellant then hired his

present attorney and moved that the case be remanded for a
preliminary hearing (R. 4, R. 18).

Appellant later requested

that the case be transferred from the Justice of the Peace
Court to the Circuit Court (R. 20).

After these delays,

caused by appellant, arraignment was set for October 6, 1981.
Trial was nine days later.

The jury found appellant guilty of

theft.
Appellant, prior to 1975, had been convicted of
another felony (T. 86).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
FROM COUNSEL IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THESE
PROCEEDINGS.
Appellant's original counsel, Charles

w.

Taylor, was

appointed to represent both appellant and his son.

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Point

I I of his brief,

appellant now claims that this dual

representation caused Mr. Taylor to be an ineffective
advocate.
Appellant claims that Mr. Taylor allegedly
encouraged appellant to waive the preliminary hearing, plead
guilty, and waive his right to confront witnesses and to trial
by jury so that the charges against appellant's son would be
droppe~.

record.

However, these contentions are not supported in the
Appellant did waive the preliminary hearing {R. 8);

however, even in appellant's own affidavit {R. 18), he does
not claim that he intended to plead guilty.

There is no

support in the record for appellant's claim that he waived his
right to confront witnesses or to be tried by a jury.
fact, appellant received a jury trial.

In

Also, the record does

not support appellant's claim that the charges against his son
were dropped at all, let alone in exchanqe for appellant's
waiver of the preliminary hearing.

Therefore, despite

appellant' assertions to the contrary, the only waiver
appellant made was of his statutory right to a preliminary
hearing, which he later received anyway.
Although appellant retained his present counsel
immediately after waiving the preliminary hearing, he first
raises the issue of ineffective counsel on appeal.

This Court

has stated that it generally will not rule on issues raised
for the first time on appeal.

State v. Lee, Utah, 633 P.2d
-4-
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48 (1981); State v. Hales, Utah,
18083, decided July 7, 1982).

P.2d

(Case No.

In this case, appellant could

have raised this issue long before even the trial stage since
he had new counsel for his preliminary hearing.
In State v. McQueen, 14 Utah 2d 311, 383 P.2d 921,
922 (1963), the defendant for the first time on appeal raised
the issue of unlawful search, seizure and arrest.

This Court

stated:
We cannot canvas any such issue on appeal
here.
The state had no opportunity to
meet such issues, which were interjected
for the first time on appeal. • . • It is
obvious that to review such extraneous
matter would be offensive to appellate
practice and highly prejudicial to the
opposition, who had no opportunity to meet
it at the trial level (emphasis added).
In the present case, if appellant had properly raised this
issue at trial, the state could have examined witnesses to
determine whether counsel was in fact ineffective in
representing both parties.
In State v. West, 2 Kan. App. 2d 297, 578 P.2d 287
(1978), two brothers were represented at trial by the same
attorney.

One brother's defense was intoxication, but he

could not testify about his condition without implicating the
other brother.

Since the brothers' defenses conflicted and

they made timely motions for separate attorneys, the court
held that the defendants were entitled to different attorneys.
-5-
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In a similar case, the Supreme Court held that the defendants
were entitled to separate counsel because their defenses
conflicted, the evidence was weak against one defendant, and
he had objected to dual representation at trial.
United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).

Glasser v.

In both of these cases the

defendants objected to dual representation, their defenses
conflicted, and the problem occurred at trial.

In the present

case, the appellant did not object, did not show that his
defense would have conflicted, and the representation occurred
at the preliminary hearing stage.

Also, the evidence against

appellant was very strong (he was caught driving a stolen car)
(T. 51, 55).
This Court, in State v. Albert, Utah, 584 P.2d 843
(1978), reasoned that when a defendant freely consented to the
appointment of counsel and had time to consult with him before
pleading guilty, he was not denied adequate counsel.

In this

case appellant freely consented to Mr. Taylor's appointment
and had time to consult with him before waiving his
preliminary hearing.
In addition to the fact that appellant failed to
timely raise this issue by objecting to the appointment, there
is nothing in the record to support the claim of ineffective
counsel.

Appellant has the burden of showing how his counsel

was ineffective and the proof must be a demonstrable reality,
not mere speculation.

State v. McNicol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203
-6-
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(1976).

Appellant must demonstrate that dual representation

caused his attorney to be less effective.
Utah, 584 P.2d 892 (1978).

State v. Tippetts,

Apparently, appellant's counsel

is merely speculating that since appellant waived the
preliminary hearing and his original counsel represented both
appellant and his son, the original counsel must have been
ineffective.

The record does not reflect any inherent

conflict or prejurlice to appellant's case.

This Court has

stated that " • • • we are not inclined to reverse a conviction
on matters dehors the record."
Utah

State v. Starlight Club, 17

2o 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965).
Even if appellant waived the preliminary hearing so

that the charges against his son would be dropped, this does
not prove that his attorney was ineffective.

In People v.

Duran, 498 P.2d 937 (Colo. 1972), the defendant entered a
guilty plea so that the charges against his wife would be
dropped.

He was concerned about the effect on his five

children and the possibility of losing custody of them if his
wife were convicted.

The court accepten the plea because it

was not a result of deceit, enhancement or coercion.
In a similar case, Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397,
483

~.2d

437 (1971), the defendant also pled guilty (as his

attorney advised) so that the charges against his wife would
be dropped.

This Court did not find a conflict in dual

representation when the defendant entered his plea.

The

present case is within the scope of these cases since the
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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defendants in those cases were pleading guilty while in the
present case the appellant merely waived a preliminary
hearing.

Thus, "the mere fact of multiple representation,

standing alone, does not amount to a conflict of interest."
People v. Romero, 189 Col. 526, 543 P.2d 56 (1975).

Even if

appellant did waive his preliminary hearing to help his son,
this fact alone does not establish that his counsel was
ineffective.
The fact that appellant waived the preliminary
hearing is actually irrelevant to his claim of ineffective
counsel because no plea can be given at that stage.

A

preliminary hearing is merely to oetermine whether there is
sufficient evidence to hold the defendant.
24 Utah 2o 126, 467 P.2d 43 (1970).

Crouch v. State,

In this case, the

evidence was certainly sufficient to hold appellant since he
was caught "red-handed."

Therefore, whether appellant waived

the hearing or not, the result

woul~

have been the same--he

woula be bound over to district court for arraignment.
In McGuffey v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P.2d 166,
167 (1967), this Court stated:
It is rather difficult to see how a guilty
defendant is prejudiced by waiving a
preliminary hearing when all that is
entailed at the hearing is that sufficient
evidence be given to the committing
magistrate to cause him to believe that a
crime has been committed and that there is
probable cause to believe the defendant is
guilty thereof (emphasis added).
-8-
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Similarly, in Seibold v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 165, 435 P.2d 289,
290 (1967), this Court stated "Under our practice the
preliminary hearing is not a critical stage of criminal
procedure."

See also:

State v. Starratt, 153 N.W.2d 311

(N.D. 1967).
This Court, in State v. Gray, Utah, 601 P.2d 918,
920 (1979), held that even if counsel was ineffective, the
conviction should not be reversed unless a likelihood exists
that different counsel would have caused a different result.
This Court thouqht that the defendant did not ''establish
anything more than mere speculation as to prejudice becaue of
ineffectiveness of his counsel."

Appellant's contention is

also only speculation, and there is no likelihood that a
different attorney would have caused a different result since
appellant received a hearing anyway.
This Court confronted the flaw in appellant's
contention in State v. Sims, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313,
1315 (1974):
In regard to the defendant's contention
that he was denied effective counsel: we
are impelled to remark that it is nothing
less than shameful that our law seems to
have degenerated to a point where whenever
an accused is convicted of a crime, the
charge of incompetency of counsel is, with
ever increasing frequency, leveled at
capable attorneys who have given entirely
adequate service, when the real difficulty
was that he had a guilty client (emphasis
added).

-9-
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS TO PRODUCE AND DISMISS
SINCE THE REQUESTED EVIDENCE WAS
UNNECESSARY IN THE DETEPMINATION OF
APPELLANT'S GUILT.
In Point V of his brief, appellant claims that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant's
Motion to Produce.

Appellant contends that he needed to

examine the stolen automobile because, allegedly, a conflict
existed in identification of the vehicle.

A

defendant has no

right to examine the state's evidence unless required by
statute.

Mendelsohn v. People, 353 P.2d 587 (Colo. 1960).

Indeed, in this case the car was not to be introduced as
evidence at all by the state.

The Supreme Court has stated

"There is no general right to discovery in a criminal case.
•

•

•

"

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
In Utah, the Legislature has set forth discovery

rules.

Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-16(5)

(1981 Supp.} provides

that the court shall determine whether defendant is entitled
to examine an item of evidence, based on defendant's showing
that the evidence is needed to adequately prepare his defense.
Thus, the trial court has broad discretion in granting or
denying Motions to Produce.
P.2d 852 (1950).

State v. Lack, 118 Utah 128, 221

Appellant must show that the trial court

abused this discretion by denying his motion before its ruling
-10-
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will be overturned.

State v. Oldham, 438 P.2d 275 (Idaho

1968); State v. Tyler, 466 P.2d 120 (Wash. 1970); State v.
Lybert, 30 Utah 2d 180, 515 P.2d 441 (1973).
In an apparent attempt to show that the trial court
abused its discretion here, appellant quotes a definition of
discretion given in Carmens v. Slavens, Utah, 546 P.2d 601,
603 (1976).

However, the case is not particularly relevant in

this matter, as demonstrated by the final sentence in the
paragraph appellant quotes, which appellant failed to include:
It has always been the policy of our law
to resolve doubts in favor of permitting
parties to have their day in court on the
merits of a controversy (emphasis added).
This Court was referring to the trial court's failure to allow
the defendant to have a trial, a much more serious matter than
the denial of a Motion to Produce.
This Court has defined the meaning of "abuse of
discretion" in many cases.

The judge's actions clearly must

be inherently unfair so that no reasonable person could adopt
the court's view.
(1978).

State v. Gerrard, Utah, 584 P.2d 885

It must be clear that the court's decision likely

resulten in an injustice to the defendant.
Utah, 599 P.2d 518 (1979).

The trial court's determination

must clearly appear to be error.
2d 129, 499 P.2d 276 (1972).

State v. Danker,

State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah

Respondent contends that

appellant has failed to show an abuse of discretion in this
case.
-11-
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There are several ways to analyze whether the trial
court abused its discretion in denying appellant's Motion to
Produce.

First, would the evidence have created a reasonable

doubt of appellant's guilt.
541, 529 P.2d 253 (1974).

State v. Wilder, 22 Ariz. App.
In this case, appellant was

apprehended when driving a stolen vehicle.

The license plates

were stolen from another vehicle belonging to one of
appellant's relatives (T. 64, 65).

While it is true the

serial number from the car door did not match the
registration, appellant knew that this alleged conflict
existed without examining the car.

He was able to introduce a

police officer's testimony at trial affirming that the serial
number on the door did not match the registration.

Thus, he

was able to use any identification conflict to his advantage
at trial to attempt to create reasonable doubt of his guilt.
It was unnecessary for appellant to actually examine the car
to bolster his apparent but unstated claim that the car was
not stolen.

The alleged conflict was easily explainable

because the car doors had been replaced; therefore the serial
number did not match.

In fact, appellant surely realized this

since the copy of the title for the serial number from the car
door was registered "inactive" (R. 27).

An examination of the

car would have created no more doubt than the testimony of the
conflict given by an uninteresten witness di~, and thus was
unnecessary.
-12-
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The second test is whether it was prejudicial or
unfair to appellant to deny his motion.

In State v. Stewart,

Utah, 544 P.2d 477 (1975), the police erased a tape made
during a drug sale.

Since the defendant denied that there was

a sale, the fact the tape was erased was immaterial.
not vital to the issue of guilt.

It was

In this case, appellant made

no claim at trial that the car was not stolen, or was not
owned by Eric Wichgram.

In fact, he has made no showing at

all that the evidence was vital to the issue of guilt or
material to his case.
884 (1977).

State v. White, 98 Idaho 781, 572 P.2d

The owner of the car identified it extensively at

trial through the custom work he performed on it such as
mechanical repairs, replacing the seats and doors, and
installing a stereo system.

There was no real noubt that he

was the owner and that appellant had stolen the automobile,
thus it was not prejudicial to appellant's case to deny the
motion.
The third test requires appellant to establish that
the evidence would be favorable to him.

State v. Ward, 98

Idaho 571, 569 P.2d 916 (1977); State v. Oliverez, 34 Or. App.
417, 578 P.2d 502 (1978).

In State v. Koennecke, 545 P.2d 127

(Or. 1976), defendant was charged with attempted murder for
firing a gun at a police officer.

His defense was that a

second officer at the scene was the person firing at the
officer.

The court denied his motion for discovery of the
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officer's guns because the defendant failed to show that
testing of the revolvers would disclose any favorable
evidence.

In this case, too, appellant has failed to show how

an examination of the car would produce evidence favorable to
him.

Also, any potential probative value in examining the car

was far outweighed by the burden of producing the car, then in
Maryland.
Appellant further contenos that the trial court
erred in not granting appellant's Motion to Dismiss.

Again,

appellant is relying on the fact that the serial number on the
car door dirl not match the registration.

Respondent contends

that appellant's Motion to Dismiss was properly denied.
Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-6-404 (1953), as amended,

states:
A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to
deprive him thereof.
In this case, the state proved the requisite elements of
theft.

Appellant cites State v. Hall, 105 Utah 162, 145 P.2d

494 (1944), in which this Court states that the goods found in
defendant's possession must be identified as the goods stolen.
In that case, which involved the theft of some cases of spark
plugs, the state had failed to show that the spark plugs in
defendant's possession were the ones which were stolen.

-14-
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In

the present case, the state dio prove that the car in
defendant's possession was "the property of another" and was
stolen.

The state proved this through the registration and

insurance cards found in the vehicle, the owner's extensive
testimony, photographs of the vehicle, and the fact that
appellant did not claim to own the car at trial.

It was not

necessary that the state actually prove who owned the car.

In

State v. Simmons, Utah, 573 P.2d 341, 343 (1977), this Court
remarked that the Utah theft statute:
does not require the state to conclusively
prove who owned the property in question,
only that the accused obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the
property of another.
Ownership proof is simply not an element that the state must
prove.

The trial court merely left the alleged weakness in

identification evidence to the jury to be a factor in creating
any possible reasonable doubt.

State v. Buckley, 557 P.2d 283

(Montana 1976).
Further, appellant has not challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction.
not present any defense.

He did

Thus it is difficult to see how an

examination of the car would have aided in his case.
Ambrose, Utah, No. 16148, decided February 7, 1980
(unreported).

-15-
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State v.

Finally, appellant claims that his proposed Jury
instruction number 3 should have been given; however,
appellant failed to include it in the record designated on
appeal, as required by Rule 76(a)(l), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

In Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P.2d

154 (1963), this Court held that when the record is devoid of
evidence, it is assumed that the court below found a
sufficient basis to support and iustify its findings.

Thus,

it can be assumed the trial court correctly refused to give

appellant's requested jury instruction.
POINT III
APPELLANT RECEIVED A SPEEDY TRIAL AND
PRELIMINARY HEARING WITHIN THE ST.~TUTORY
REQUIREMENT.
In Point III of his brief, appellant contends he did
not receive a speedy trial, as required by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).

However, the

Supreme Court has not set a specific time limit in determining
when a defendant has not had a speedy trial.
407 U.S. 514 (1972).
§

Barker v. Wingo,

The Utah Legislature, in Utah Code Ann.,

77-l-6(h), has set a time limit requiring that trials must

be held within thirty days after arraignment "if the business
of the court permits."

-16-
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In this particular case, appellant was arrested on
June 25, 1981.

His trial was held on October 10, 1981.

Appellant waived his original preliminary hearing in Justice
of the Peace Court on July 17 (R. 1).

At his arraignment in

District Court on July 28, appellant requested that the case
be remanded to Justice of the Peace Court for a preliminary
hearing (R. 18).

Again, at appellant's request, the case was

transferred from the Justice of the Peace Court to the Circuit
Court for preliminary hearing, which was held within ten days
after transfer thereto (R. 5).

Appellant also filed a Motion

to Dismiss, in part alleging that he had not received a speedy
trial.

The motion was denied on October 6, 1981; appellant's

arraignment was held the same day.

Appellant's trial date was

October 15, 1981, nine days after his arraignment and,
contrary to appellant's contention, well within the thirty-day
limit set by statute.
Any pre-trail delay in this case was clearly caused
by appellant and was for his benefit.

He initially waived his

preliminary hearing and requested that the case be remanded
for a preliminary hearing; he also requested the transfer to
Circuit Court.

The delay occasioned by the transfers was

caused in an effort to accommodate appellant and cannot be
included in computing the time before trial.
Velasquez, Utah, 641 P.2d 115

(1982)~

State v.

State v. Baker, Utah,

Case No. 17288, decided March 3, 1982 (unreported); Taggard v.
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State, 500 P.2d 238 (Alaska 1972); State v. English, 594 P.2d
1069 (Hawaii 1978); Woods v. State, 588 P.2a 1030 (Nevada
1979); and State v. Cuzze, 225 Kan. 274, 589 P.2d 626 {1979).
Therefore, the time period between remanding the case for
preliminary hearing and the arraignment was not an
unreasonable delay in the proceedings.
Even the balancing test set forth by the Supreme
Court in Barker, supra, adopted by this Court in State v.
Hafen, Utah, 593 P.2d 538 (1979), yields the same result.
That test includes four factors:

the length of the delay, the

reason therefor, whether defendant asserted his right to a
speedy trial, and whether the defendant was prejudiced by the
delay.

In Barker, the length of the delay was 5 years; in

Hafen it was almost 8 months.

In those cases, as the present

one (3-1/2 months' delay), the length of delay was not
conclusively too long.

The reason for the delay, as mentioned

above, was for appellant's benefit and at his request.
Appellant did assert his right to a speedy trial--and received
one within the statutory thirty days; and appellant was not
prejudiced.

He was effectively represented by counsel, as

discussed in Point I.

Also, appellant had no real need to

examine the stolen automobile, as discussed in Point II, and
thus the delay did not prejudice him in this respect.
A factor this Court considers is whether the delay
was intentionally caused by the prosecutor.

If the defendant
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was not prejudiced and the delay was unintentional, this Court
has found that the defendant received a speedy trial.

State

v. Rasmussen, 18 Utah 2d 201, 418 P.2d 134 (1966); State v.
Archuletta, Utah, 577 P.2d 547 (1978).

In this case,

appellant does not contend, ann the record does not reflect
any intentional delay caused by the state.
This Court, in Rasmussen, supra, stated that the
30-day extension is not mandatory.

Instead, each case shouln

be examined in light of its facts.

Since appellant received

his trial within thirty days after arraignment, was not
prejudiced by any delay, caused the delay himself, and any
delay was unintentional, he was not denied a speedy trial.
The same analysis applies to appellant's allegation
that he was not given a preliminary hearing until after the
10-day limit of Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-7(c).

As shown above,

after appellant's requested transfer of the case to the
Circuit Court, the preliminary hearing was held within the
ten-day limit (R. 5).

Since all the delay up to that point

was caused by the appellant, he cannot be heard to complain on
appeal that he was prejudiced by the delay.
Of course, there is no constitutional right to a
"speedy preliminary hearing," but merely a statutory
entitlement to such a hearing, if not waived, within ten days
of the initial appearance before a committing magistrate if
-19-
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the defendant is in custody.

Where this is the case, the

appellant must clearly establish prejudice in order to prevail
on his claim.

Cf. Crowe v. State, Utah,

No. 18227, decined May 25, 1982).

P.2d

(Case

In this case, appellant has

not met this burden and thus his conviction should be
af firmea.
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S AUTOMOBILE WAS PROPERLY
STOPPED SINCE THE LICENSE PLATES WERE
STOLEN.
In Point I of his brief, appellant claims that the
police officer stopped his car on mere suspicion, which
violated his constitutional rights.

Appellant cites Mallory

v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) and Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89 (1964) for the proposition that "mere suspicion is not
sufficient to establish probable cause for a stop despite the
good intentions of an office."

However, appellant's

application of those cases is incorrect.

Both Mallory, supra,

and Beck, supra, refer to good faith and probable cause when
arresting someone, not merely stopping someone.
The Supreme Court, in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (1979), set guidelines for police officers when stopping
automobiles.

The officer must have an "articulate and

reasonable suspicion" that a violation of law exists.
-20-
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In that

case, the officer did not suspect the driver of violating any
law.
time.

He stopped the car only because he was not busy at the
The Court felt that the officer violated the driver's

rights when he stoppeo the automobile without having an
articulate and reasonable suspicion that the driver had broken

a law.
Utah Code Ann.,

§

77-7-15 also requires an officer

to have a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or
will commit an offense before stopping him.

The Utah Supreme

Court, in State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 534, 536
(1973·), stated a test for reasonableness:
. • • that is, whether fair-minded
persons, knowing the facts, and taking
into consideration not only the rights of
the individuals involved in the inquiry or
search, but also the broader interests of
the public to be protected from crime and
criminals, would regard the conduct of the
officers as being unreasonable.
In that case, police officers received a radio report that a
robbery had just occurred.
two men in a car.

Minutes later, the police stoppen

The court thought the stop was reasonable

since the car was in the area where the robbery occurred,
although the report did not contain a description of any
automobile.
The courts have heln that police stops are
reasonable in many situations:

when nefendants appeared to be

casing a shop, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 {1968); when police
-21-
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received a tip that some member of a

fa~ily

would be making a

"marijuana run," State v. Ballesteros, 531 P.2 1149 (Ariz.
1975); when defendant attempted to avoid the officer, State v.
Baltier, 498 P.2d 515 (Ariz. App. 1972); and when a driver
appeared to be unfamiliar with his car (although the car had
not been reported stolen).

United States v. Solomon, 528 F.2d

88 (1975).

In a recent Utah decision, State v. Elliott, Utah
626 P.2d 423 (1981), the defendant had attempted to sell tires
and automobile accessories at very low prices to a service
station to pay for gasoline.

The Court thought the police

officer was justified in stopping the vehicle although a
license plate check had revealed that the truck was not
stolen.

In all of these cases, a reasonable suspicion of

defendant's activity was adequate for the police to make a
stop.
In the present case, the officer saw the defendant's
automobile "coming down the hill at a high rate of speed" (T.
50).

When the officer began to overtake the car, it slowed

down (T. 50).

On these facts alone, the officer was justified

in stopping the defendant for a speeding violation; but as a
precaution, the officer checked the license plate to see if
the car was stolen (T. 50).

When the license plate was

reported as stolen, the officer stopped the vehicle (T. 52,
5).

In this case the officer had even more grounds for
-2~4. ..
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reasonable suspicion than in Torres, supra, where the
defendants were merely in the vicinity of a robbery, and in
Elliott, supra, where the license plate was reported as not
stolen.
Under these facts, the officer's conduct was clearly
reasonable in stopping the car.

In fact, he would have been

neglecting his duties as a police officer if he had not
stopped the automobile bearing stolen license plates.

Thus,

appellant's Motion to Suppress Evidence resulting from the
stop was properly denied.
POINT V

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
HABEAS CORPUS WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO RAISE A
SPEEDY TRIAL ISSUE.
In Point IV of his brief, appellant claims that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying his petition for
habeas corpus.

In his statement of facts, appellant further

claims that the trial court held that a motion to dismiss, not
habeas corpus, was the appropriate method to raise the issue
of lack of a speedy trial.

However, appellant failed to

designate any portion of the habeas corpus proceedings on
appeal and therefore it is impossible to ascertain why the
writ, if any, was denied.
Assuming appellant did petition for habeas corpus,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring

-23-
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appellant to file a motion to dismiss, rather than habeas
corpus proceedings.

A writ of habeas corpus

is used in

unusual circumstances, as when a court lacks jurisdiction, the
prosecutor has fabricated evidence, or there is a substantial
failure of due process.

Gallegos v. Turner, 17 Utah 2d 273,

409 P.2d 386 (1965).
In Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121,
122 (1967), this Court discussed habeas corpus, stating:
The writ is, as our rules describe it, an
extraordinary writ, to be used to protect
one who is restrained of his liberty where
there exists no jurisdiction or authority,
or where the requirements of the law have
been so ignored or distorted that the
party is substantially and effectively
denied what is included in the term due
process of law or where some other such
circumstance exists that it would be
wholly unconscionable not to re-examine
the conviction.
This standard was reiterated with approval in Gentry v. Smith,
Utah, 600 P.2d 1007 (1979), overruled on other grounds.

The

writ of habeas corpus is to be used "only in circumstances
which cannot be adequately dealt with by the ordinary rules of
procedure."

Syddall v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 263, 437 P.2d 194

(1968).
In this case, habeas corpus was properly denied for
two reasons.

First, appellant fails to claim that the court

lacked jurisdiction, or that the requirements of law were so
-24-
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distorted that he was substantially and effectively denied due
process.

Second, appellant's claim of lack of speedy trial

could be adequately dealt with using ordinary procedural
rules.
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
(a) • • • Where no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy exists, relief may be
obtained by appropriate action under
these Rules, on any one of the grounds set
forth in subdivisions (b) and (f) of this
Rule (emphasis added).
(Rule 65B(f), cited in appellant's brief on page 10 concerns
habeas corpus.)
Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-25, headed "Dismissal
without trial," states:
(a) In its discretion, for substantial
cause and in furtherance of justice, the
court may, either on its own initiative or
upon application of either party, order an
information or indictment dismissed.

(b) The Court shall dismiss the
information or indictment when:
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant at
trial;
In this case, a motion to dismiss was the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy which made habeas corpus inappropriate.

In other jurisdictions, the courts have also held
that a motion to dismiss is the correct method of raising a
speedy trial issue.

Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394
-25-
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(1962); People v. Murphy, 212 Ill.

584, 72 N.E. 902 (1904);

State v. Cuzick, 5 Ariz. App. 498, 428 P.2d 443 (1967); People
v. Wilson, 32 Cal. Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452 (1963); Application
of Morris, 369 P.2d 456 (Nevada 1962).
In Ex Parte Douglas, 95 P.2d 560 (Ariz. 1939), the
court stated several reasons for requiring a motion to dismiss
before petitioning for habeas corpus.

The motion would be

made to the court in which the case was pending; that court
could best ascertain reasons for delay in the proceedings.
That court could also make a proper record to include in the
criminal proceedings.

Also, a motion to

dis~iss

is more

direct, takes less time and is less expensive.
There are other circumstances, somewhat similar to
the facts herein, in which habeas corpus is inappropriate.
Several courts have held that a defendant should file a motion
to suppress to challenge evidence rather than petitioning for
habeas corpus when claiming an illegal search.

State v.

Smith, 391 P.2d 849 (Idaho 1964); Dahl v. Sheriff, 553 P.2d
949 (Nev. 1976); In re Anders, 158 Cal. Rptr. 661, 599 P.2d
1364 (1979).

When a defendant wishes to challenge the bail

amount set, courts have held it must be done by a motion to
reduce bond, not by habeas corpus.

Petition of Grady, 530

P.2d 461 (Montana 1974); State v. Dunnan, 223 Kan. 428, 573
P.2d 1068 (1978).

Thus, habeas corpus is not a suitable

remedy in situations which can be dealt with instead by filing
a motion.
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Appellant had no real grounds for habeas corpus
anyway.

He was not denied a speedy trial, as discussed in

Point III.

By improperly attempting to secure habeas corpus

relief instead of utilizing a motion to oismiss, appellant
actually caused even more delay before trial.

Appellant

received a hearing on his motion to dismiss based on the same
claims as in his habeas corpus petition, and the motion was
denied (R. 20) since appellant caused any delays before trial.
Either through habeas corpus or a motion to dismiss, the
result would have been the same since there was no merit in
appellant's speedy trial claim.

Thus, appellant has failed to

establish any prejudice ano this claim lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, appellant's conviction
and sentence should be affirmed.

He received effective

assistance of counsel, he did not need to examine the stolen
vehicle to prepare his defense, he had a speedy trial, he was
properly stopped for stolen license plates, and his petition

for habeas corpus was not a proper method to raise his speedy
trial issue.
Respectfully submitted this

day of August,

1982.

DAVID L.

ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
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